Plato

Meno Plato

This Dialogue begins abruptly with a question of Meno, who asks, 'whether virtue can betaught.' Socrates replies that he does not as yet know what virtue is, and has never knownanyone who did. 'Then he cannot have met Gorgias when he was at Athens.' Yes, Socrateshad met him, but he has a bad memory, and has forgotten what Gorgias said. Will Meno tellhim his own notion, which is probably not very different from that of Gorgias? 'O yes-nothing easier: there is the virtue of a man, of a woman, of an old man, and of a child; thereis a virtue of every age and state of life, all of which may be easily described.'Socrates reminds Meno that this is only an enumeration of the virtues and not adefinition of the notion which is common to them all. In a second attempt Meno definesvirtue to be 'the power of command.' But to this, again, exceptions are taken. For theremust be a virtue of those who obey, as well as of those who command; and the power ofcommand must be justly or not unjustly exercised. Meno is very ready to admit that justiceis virtue: 'Would you say virtue or a virtue, for there are other virtues, such as courage, temperance, and the like; just as round is a figure, and black and white are colours, and yetthere are other figures and other colours. Let Meno take the examples of figure and colour, and try to define them.' Meno confesses his inability, and after a process of interrogation, inwhich Socrates explains to him the nature of a 'simile in multis, ' Socrates himself definesfigure as 'the accompaniment of colour.' But some one may object that he does not knowthe meaning of the word 'colour;' and if he is a candid friend, and not a mere disputant, Socrates is willing to furnish him with a simpler and more philosophical definition, intowhich no disputed word is allowed to intrude: 'Figure is the limit of form.' Menoimperiously insists that he must still have a definition of colour. Some raillery follows; andat length Socrates is induced to reply, 'that colour is the effluence of form, sensible, and indue proportion to the sight.' This definition is exactly suited to the taste of Meno, whowelcomes the familiar language of Gorgias and Empedocles. Socrates is of opinion that themore abstract or dialectical definition of figure is far better. Now that Meno has been made to understand the nature of a general definition, heanswers in the spirit of a Greek gentleman, and in the words of a poet, 'that virtue is todelight in things honourable, and to have the power of getting them.' This is a nearerapproximation than he has yet made to a complete definition, and, regarded as a piece ofproverbial or popular morality, is not far from the truth. But the objection is urged, 'that thehonourable is the good, ' and as every one equally desires the good, the point of thedefinition is contained in the words, 'the power of getting them.' 'And they must be gotjustly or with justice.' The definition will then stand thus: 'Virtue is the power of gettinggood with justice.' But justice is a part of virtue, and therefore virtue is the getting of goodwith a part of virtue. The definition repeats the word def