Executive Compensations Package and Stock Splits: Are Managers More Inclined to Split Their Shares if They Stand to Personally Benefit from It? - Robbert Broens - Grāmatas - LAP LAMBERT Academic Publishing - 9783844305197 - 2011. gada 10. februāris
Ja vāks un nosaukums nesakrīt, pareizs ir nosaukums

Executive Compensations Package and Stock Splits: Are Managers More Inclined to Split Their Shares if They Stand to Personally Benefit from It?

Cena
€ 45,49

Pasūtīts no attālās noliktavas

Paredzamā piegāde . gada 25. nov. - . gada 3. dec.
Ziemassvētku dāvanas var atgriezt līdz 31. janvārim
Saņemiet paziņojumus par jauniem Robbert Broens izdevumiem
Pievienot savam iMusic vēlmju sarakstam

Not rated yet

Are managers more inclined to split their shares if they stand to personally benefit from them? The greater the variable compensation in the remuneration package, i.e., the more a compensation package represents a ?call? option on the stock; the more inclined CEOs are to split the firms' shares. Accompanied by the increase in stock price and volatility subsequent to a stock split, CEOs can increase the value of their option packages by splitting the firm's shares as it sends a credible signal to the market. By focusing on stock option exercise behaviour of CEOs I provide initial evidence that executives use the stock split to time option exercises.

Mediji Grāmatas     Paperback Book   (Grāmata ar mīksto vāku un līmēto muguru)
Izlaists 2011. gada 10. februāris
ISBN13 9783844305197
Izdevēji LAP LAMBERT Academic Publishing
Lapas 56
Izmēri 225 × 3 × 150 mm   ·   102 g
Valoda Vācu