Free will, indeterminacy, a - Deutschmann - Grāmatas - GRIN Verlag - 9783640315598 - 2009. gada 7. maijs
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Free will, indeterminacy, a

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Seminar paper from the year 2007 in the subject Philosophy - Theoretical (Realisation, Science, Logic, Language), grade: A- (=1,25), University of California, Berkeley (Department of Philosophy), course: Collective Intentionality (John Searle), 18 entries in the bibliography, language: English, comment: The paper is a very good introduction to the current debate on free will. It engages one of the central questions of the debate, the conflict between compatibilists and incompatibilist views of free will. In the often confusing discussion it sticks to three influential texts: John Searle's "Freedom and Neurobiology", Harry Frankfurt's "Freedom of Will and the Concept of a Person" and Peter Strawson's "Freedom and Resentment". , abstract: Free will is one of the most fundamental presuppositions that we make in our everyday lives. At the same time, free will belongs to the concepts that are most difficult to integrate into a scientific idea of how the world works. This contrast has haunted philosophers for centuries, and although it seems that almost everything has already been said about this topic, there has been an animated debate in recent decades. In this paper, I would like to consider two of the positions adopted in this debate. At first, I would like to explore John Searle's interpretation of free will as a sequence of several moments of indeterminacy ("gaps") between the reasons for our actions and the actions themselves. I think the best way to understand his conception is to see it as an attempt to unite two different ideas about the relation between reasons and actions. On the one hand, the realist conception of Searle's philosophy presupposes that the reasons for our actions must have real causal power and are not only post facto justifications. On the other hand, Searle's understanding of rationality implies that reasons alone cannot be sufficient causes. In "Rationality in Action" Searle tries to bring both ideas together through the notion of an agen

Mediji Grāmatas     Paperback Book   (Grāmata ar mīksto vāku un līmēto muguru)
Izlaists 2009. gada 7. maijs
ISBN13 9783640315598
Izdevēji GRIN Verlag
Lapas 28
Izmēri 138 × 2 × 213 mm   ·   56 g
Valoda Vācu  

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