Pastāsti draugiem par šo preci:
Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations Peter D. Feaver
Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations
Peter D. Feaver
How do civilians control the military? In his book, Feaver proposes a new theory that treats civil-military relations as a principal-agent relationship, with the civilian executive monitoring the actions of military agents, the “armed servants” of the nation-state.
400 pages, 38 line illustrations, 15 tables
| Mediji | Grāmatas Paperback Book (Grāmata ar mīksto vāku un līmēto muguru) |
| Izlaists | 2005. gada 15. marts |
| ISBN13 | 9780674017610 |
| Izdevēji | Harvard University Press |
| Lapas | 400 |
| Izmēri | 150 × 228 × 26 mm · 560 g |
| Valoda | Angļu |